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Abstract
This paper studies the design of retirement and disability policies. It illustrates the
often observed exit from the labor force of healthy workers through disability insurance
schemes. Two types of individuals, disabled and leisure-prone ones, have the same
disutility for labor and cannot be distinguished. However, they are not counted in the
same way in social welfare. Benefits depend on retirement age and on the (reported)
health status. We determine first- and second-best optimal benefit levels and retirement
ages and focus on the distortions which may be induced in the individuals’ retirement
decision. Then we introduce the possibility of testing which sorts out disabled workers
from healthy but retirement-prone workers. We show that such testing can increase
both social welfare and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled
workers are better taken care of. It is not optimal to test all applicants, nor to apply
testing to all types of benefits. Surprisingly, the (second-best) solution may imply later
retirement for the disabled than for the leisure prone. In that case, the disabled are
compensated by higher benefits.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade the future of pension systems has been a widely debated issue. The
challenges posed by the ongoing process of demographic aging are by now understood.
However, aging is only part of the story. The generalized decrease of entry ages into
retirement is also a significant problem. There are a number of explanations for this
trend. The dominant one is the implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers.
This argument is based on the idea that workers have, individually or collectively, a
large degree of discretion concerning retirement age. In that line, Gruber and Wise
(1999, 2004) have shown for a dozen of OECD countries that households often face very
powerful financial incentives pushing them to retire early.
Some of these incentives may result from the deliberate choice of decision makers:
early retirement schemes in some declining industries, disability insurance for disabled
workers, unemployment insurance for workers who have no chance to find another job.
It might be the case that policy makers have used too much of these policies with the
complicity of unions and management. On some occasions programs might also have
been diverted from their original purpose. For instance, unemployment and disability
insurance have at times been used not only to compensate for “genuine” unemployment
or disability but also to allow healthy and still productive workers to withdraw from
the labor force. When looking at the data on disability — for unemployment, the issue
is trickier — it is clear that they do not only encompass disabled workers. They also
include people who want to stop working and to benefit from a system with slacking
control.
“Flaws” in control can be deliberate or not. They can certainly be due to bad
policy design. However, it is not clear either that a systematic use of tight controls
to all applicants for (say) disability benefits is necessarily the appropriate policy. The
question is where to draw the line between disability benefits, which would be subject
to more or less tight screening, and (early) retirement benefits which are conditional
only on age (and on the individual’s retirement decision). This is one of the questions
discussed in this paper. In particular, we show that without control a number of workers
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who highly value leisure will use disability insurance as a way to leave the labor market.
This has two consequences: a relatively low age of retirement but more importantly a
relatively low level of disability benefits.
We use a simple model with three different types of individuals with identical produc-
tivity: hard working individuals, retirement-prone individuals and disabled individuals.
At first sight, the latter two look very much alike. However, the disabled have a high
disutility of labor because effort hurts them while the retirement-prone individuals have
the same high disutility because they like leisure. The social planner would like to give
more weight to the disabled than to the two other ones that we will call the hard-working
and the lazy ones. However if it cannot sort out the lazy and the disabled, they will be
given the same package (or at least the same utility level).
We then introduce an audit procedure which allows for such sorting out. More
precisely, there is a testing procedure which reveals individuals health status so that the
disabled can be identified. We show that such control can increase both social welfare
and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled workers are better
taken care of. However, we also show that it is not optimal to test all applicants, nor to
apply testing to all types of benefits. To some extent the solution without audit looks
very much like what is observed in a number of countries where there is a clear abuse of
disability insurance programs with the consequence of low participation rate of elderly
workers and with an erosion of disability benefits for budgetary reasons. The solution
with audit looks like what was prevailing at the start of social security programs and
what a number of economists are now advocating to increase the age of retirement: stop
to use disability insurance as an early retirement program.
We have already mentioned the papers which show that disability insurance and
other programs are standard routes for exiting the labor force before the normal retire-
ment age. In addition, there are papers that specifically deal with disability insurance.
In the United States there is a lot of work on the interaction between disability insur-
ance and the labor market. Parsons (1980) in a widely quoted paper shows that social
security program explains a large fraction of the postwar decline in prime-age labor force
participation. This study was followed by several ones which never disputed the disin-
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centive effects of disability insurance but questioned their magnitude [see e.g. Bound
(1989), Parsons (1980, 1991) and Gruber (2000)]. This literature shows that there are
two issues: one concerns the number of truly disabled workers and the other concerns
the number of beneficiaries from disability insurance. Putting aside employment policy
considerations, the difference between these two numbers comes from the difficulty to
sort out true disabled workers in a world of asymmetric information.
2 A simple model of disability insurance
2.1 Preferences and types of individuals
The setting is inspired by Cremer et al. (2004). Consider an individual with productivity
w, dividing his lifetime with duration normalized to one into a period of full activity
and a period of retirement. Assume away any liquidity constraint and posit zero rate of
interest and time discount rate. The budget constraint is then given by:
1Z
0
c (t) dt =
zZ
0
w dt,
where c (t) is instantaneous consumption and z (z ≤ 1) the age of retirement. Lifetime
utility is defined as
U =
1Z
0
u (c (t)) dt−
zZ
0
r (t) dt,
where u (·) is a strictly concave instantaneous utility functions while r (t) denotes an
increasing function of effort disutility. As it will appear below r (t) can be viewed as
a mixture of taste for retirement leisure and of physical and mental inability to work
further years. We assume that r (t) varies across individuals and increases over lifetime.
Under these assumptions, the utility function and the budget constraint can be rewritten
as:
U = u (c)−R (z) ,
and
hc = wz,
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where
R(z) =
Z z
0
r(t)dt. (1)
In other words, there is perfect smoothing of consumption over time. We shall use this
reduced form for utility and budget constraint throughout the paper.
There are three types of individuals indexed i = H,L,D. We assume
rH (t) < rL (t) = rD(t) for every t (2)
which from (1) also implies RH(z) < RL(z) = RD(z). Individuals of type H are hard-
working or healthy; they have a low disutility of labor. Type D and L have the same
(high) disutility of labor which is higher than that for type H. They thus have the same
preferences over consumption and leisure. However, they differ in their “health status”.
Specifically, we think of type D as truly disabled for which the high disutility of labor
is due to a poor health. Individuals of type L, on the other hand, are in good health
but are leisure prone (or for short “lazy”). Formally, one can thus think of the health
status as a second dimension of heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is not reflected in the
individuals preferences over consumption and length of activity. However, it determines
the preferences of the social planner who roughly speaking will want to help the disabled
but not the leisure prone individuals; see below for further discussion.
Observe that (2) can also be written as
R0H(z)
u0(c)
<
R0L(z)
u0(c)
=
R0D(z)
u0(c)
, z ∈ [0, h], c > 0, (3)
which can be interpreted as a single-crossing property. For any bundle in the (z, c) space,
L and D type individuals have steeper indifference curves than H type individuals.
2.2 Policy
We now introduce the possibility of a disability/retirement insurance scheme consisting
of a payroll tax τ and a (pension) benefit function p (z) which depends on the retirement
age. This tax-transfer scheme (τ , p (z)) encompasses disability and retirement insurance
programs. For simplicity we shall often refer to this as “social insurance”. It can be
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represented by a non linear tax function
T (z) ≡
zZ
0
wτ dt−
1Z
z
p (z) dt
= zτw − (1− z) p (z) .
Differentiating T (z) with respect to z yields the marginal tax on postponed work that
underlies the retirement insurance program
T 0 (z) = τw + p (z)− (1− z) p0 (z) .
This expression shows the cost of delaying retirement which is given by τw, the payroll
tax plus p (z), the foregone pension minus the increase in benefit (p0 (z)), if any, over
the length of retirement (1− z). We refer to a social insurance program as “actuarially
neutral” at the margin if T 0 (z) = 0.1
For future reference, note that a consumer’s problem under a non-linear function
T (z) can be written as
max
z
u (wz − T (z))−R (z) . (4)
From the first-order condition we then obtain
R0 (z)
u0 (c)
= w − T 0 (z) . (5)
In words, a non-zero marginal tax implies a wedge between the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between work and consumption and the marginal productivity of labor. This
relationship is important for the interpretation of our results below.
3 Indistinguishable types with different social weights
Let us now return to the interpretation of R (z) , that is the disutility for prolonged
activity. This disutility is affected both by taste and by health factors. Some people
want to retire early because they have a strong preference for leisure and desire enjoy
1We use the term “actuarial neutrality” (or fairness) regarding retirement. This has to be distin-
guished from fairness (marginal or average) regarding the return from saving, namely the relation
between contribution and benefit. See on this Crawford and Lilien (1981) and Desmet and Jousten
(2003).
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a long retirement period. Some other people want to retire because physically they
cannot work longer. To account for this apparent ambiguity, we distinguish disabled
(D) and leisure-prone individuals (L). Clearly if disability were easily observable there
would be no problem. There are however cases when it is only observable at some cost,
the cost of medical tests.
Recall that D and L have the same function Ri (z); in other words RL (z) = RD (z).
However the social planner is not ready to consider those two types as identical. We
assume that the social planner wants to help the disabled workers but not the leisure-
prone ones. More precisely, the high disutility for prolonged activity is considered as
“legitimate” (and fully accounted for in welfare) for the disabled but not for the lazy
individuals.2 One way of introducing such a distinction is to assume a weighted social
welfare function with lower weights on type L than on type D. This leaves open the issue
of which weight to attach to H. To keep things simple, we introduce welfare weights
ϕi (i = H,L,D) such that ϕL < ϕD = ϕH . A possible justification of this choice is
to think that there is a majority of people who ex ante do not know whether they
are H or D. They maximize their expected utility with some limited concern for a
minority of leisure-prone workers who will never be disabled. An alternative approach
with paternalistic rather than Paretian social preferences is considered in Section 4
where the disutility for the lazy type L is evaluated with RH rather than RL.
3.1 Full information optimum and laissez-faire
Denoting pi the proportion of type i individuals, the first-best problem is given by:
max
ci,zi
X
i
ϕipi [u (ci)−Ri (zi)] + µ
X
i
pi (wzi − ci) . (6)
This gives the efficiency conditions:
R0H (zH)
u0 (cH)
=
R0L (zL)
u0 (cL)
=
R0L (zD)
u0 (cD)
= w, (7)
2The assumption that RL (z) = RD (z) is not important for our analysis. It is made for simplicity
because it yields crisper results in some cases. The crucial feature of our model is that the two types
are treated differently in the social welfare function. See also footnote 4
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which, not surprisingly, are equivalent to (5) with T 0(z) = 0. With objective (6) the
social optimum is Pareto efficient and we have the usual first-best tradeoffs.
We also have:
ϕH u0 (cH) = ϕL u0 (cL) = ϕD u0 (cD) = µ, (8)
so that consumption levels and retirement ages are ranked as follows:
cD = cH > cL
zD < zH zD < zL zH ≷ zL.
With this specification type D ’s individuals end up retiring earlier than the two other
ones. They consume as much as H and more than L. In other words they are compen-
sated for their disability not only by retiring earlier but also by receiving higher benefits
(which is conceivable in a social insurance setting).
The laissez-faire solution does not depend on the social objective. Consequently it
is given by equations (7) with the implication that cD = cL < cH and zD = zL < zH .
Observe that to decentralize the full information solution, one simply needs lump-sum
transfers from H and L to D and between H and L (the direction depending on the
weights). The retirement choice does not have to be distorted. This is because the
weighted objective function necessarily yields a Pareto-efficient solution so that the
second welfare theorem applies.
3.2 Unobservable types: second-best solution
Let us now turn to the second-best problem, where types are not observable. With
three types, we then have to add six incentive compatibility constraints.3 In particular,
we have
u (cL)−RL (zL) ≥ u (cD)−RL (zD) (9)
for type L and
u (cD)−RD (zD) ≥ u (cL)−RD (zL) (10)
3Each type can potentially mimick either of the two other types.
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for type D. Recalling that RL (z) ≡ RD(z) and combining (10) and (9) yields not
surprisingly:
u (cL)−RL (zL) = u (cD)−RL (zD) . (11)
In words, because D and L have the same preferences over c and z, their utility levels
must be equalized at any incentive-compatible allocation. The simplest way to achieve
(11) is of course to offer the same consumption bundle to the two types cL = cD and
consequently zL = zD. As will become clear below, this is effectively optimal even when
it is not a priori imposed.4
When types D and L are pooled, the problem of the social planner is
max
X
i
ϕipi [u (ci)−Ri (zi)] + µ
X
i
pi (wzi − ci)
+ λ [u (cH)−RH (zH)− u (cL) +RH (zL)]
where we use the subscript L for both L and D’s choices of z and c. The FOC with
respect to zH and cH yield the traditional no distortion at the top: the marginal rate of
substitution of type H continues to be given by (7). The FOC with respect to zL = zD
and cL = cD yield:
R0L (zL)
u0 (cL)
= w − λ
(ϕLpL + ϕDpD − λ)
[R0L (zL)−R0H (zL)]
u0(cL)
. (12)
where (ϕLpL + ϕDpD − λ) > 0 follows from the FOC with respect to cL = cD, while
the single-crossing property (3) implies R0L (zL) > R0H(zL). Consequently, we have a
downward distortion and a positive marginal tax on zL = zD. We have a rather standard
optimal tax problem. A distortion on z is here only justified by incentive arguments.
Per our assumptions on preferences, a downward distortion is called for to relax an
otherwise binding self-selection constraint.
3.3 Second-best with auditing
It is pretty clear that the lack of observability of the health status can be quite costly
in terms of welfare. It is particularly detrimental to the disabled workers. Because they
4That is when any bundles (cL, zL) and (cD, zD) satisfying (11) are permitted. We do not prove
this property here because the easiest proof makes use of the FOC derived in the next subsection; see
Remark 1 in Appendix A1. Observe that such a pooling may also arise when D and L do not have
identical preferences.
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are pooled with the leisure-prone ones they are forced to work longer and receive less
benefits than they would otherwise in a world of perfect observability.
To improve upon this second-best solution, one has to find ways to distinguish types
L and D. A traditional way to achieve this is to use disability evaluations.5
To study the implication of such a policy, we adopt a very simple form of audit which
perfectly reveals an individual’s “health status”.6 More precisely, the audit indicates
whether or not an individual is of type D. In particular, it can be used to distinguish
between D and L individuals. Observe that the audit also reveals mimicking between
H and D, but not between H and L (who are both in good health). When a fraction
π of type D’s reports are subject to testing, the corresponding audit cost is given by
k(pDπ). An individual who is caught cheating is subject to a sanction which reduces
his utility to some exogenous and “low” utility level of u
¯
. With this assumption, we
have to modify the revenue constraints of the government and consider six incentive
compatibility relations: X
i
pi (wzi − ci)− k(pDπ) = 0
(LD) : u (cL)−RL (zL)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RL (zD))− πu¯ > 0
(DL) : u (cD)−RL (zD)− u (cL) +RL (zL) > 0
(HD) : u (cH)−RH (zH)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RH (zD))− πu¯ > 0
(DH) : u (cD)−RL (zD)− u (cH) +RL (zH)
(HL) : u (cH)−RH (zH)− u (cL) +RH (zL) > 0
(LH) : u (cL)−RL (zL)− u (cH) +RL (zH) > 0.
The properties of the solution will of course depend on which of the incentive con-
straints are binding at the optimum. With six incentive the number of potential com-
5An alternative way, considered by Marchand et al. (2003), is to observe the consumption vectors of
both types which surely reveal their differences. One can on that basis self-select the two types with a
solution that can be implemented with non-linear taxes on consumption and income.
6There is some literature on this. In general the tests are imperfect generating errors of types 1 and
2; see Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) and Parsons (1996). As long as the probability of audit is lower
than one, our audit process implies three categories of individuals: able (or leisure-prone) individuals
who are not audited and disabled individuals who are either audited or not. In Diamond and Sheshinski
(1995) the two latter groups may contain able individuals because of type 1 and 2 errors in the audit
process. This difficulty does not arise in our setting where audits are perfect.
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binations of binding incentive constraint is quite large. To reduce the number of cases
we shall first of all make some rather plausible assumptions. First, we assume that the
weights are such that the “upwards” constraints (DH) and (LH) are not binding. With
ϕD = ϕH > ϕL it is clear that (LH) can potentially be binding when the weight on
L becomes very small. We assume that this is not the case. Second, we shall restrict
our attention to settings where (LD) is binding. This, in turn immediately implies that
(DL) is not binding (as long as π > 0).
The Lagrangian expression associated with the problem of the social planner is then
given by:
L1 =
X
i
ϕipi [u (ci)−Ri (zi)] + µ
"X
i
pi (wzi − ci)− k(pDπ)
#
+ λLD [u (cL)−RL (zL)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RL (zD))− π u¯]
+ λHL [u (cH)−RH (zH)− u (cL) +RH (zL)]
+ λHD [u (cH)−RH (zH)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RH (zD))− π u¯]
The FOC are provided in Appendix A1; they can be rearranged as follows:
MRSH =
R0H (zH)
u0 (cH)
= w (13)
MRSL =
R0L (zL)
u0 (cL)
= w − λHL [R
0
L (zL)−R0H (zL)]
(ϕLpL + λLD − λHL)u0(cL)
≤ w (14)
MRSD =
R0D (zD)
u0 (cD)
= w − λHD (1− π) [R
0
L (zD)−R0H (zD)]
ϕDpD − (λLD + λHD) (1− π)u0 (cD)
≤ w (15)
In the Appendix, we use these first-order-conditions to derive the following lemma which
further reduces the number of regimes to be considered.
Lemma 1 A solution with λHD > 0 and λHL = 0 is not possible.
Lemma 1 along with the assumption made above imply that we are left with the
following three regimes.
Regime Binding incentive constraints
1 (HL),(HD),(LD)
2 (HL),(LD)
3 (LD)
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The numerical illustrations provided in the next subsection show that each of these
three regimes can effectively occur. From the fist-order-conditions we then obtain the
following results for the different types of individuals.
Type H Whatever the regime we have from (13) that the marginal tax on z is zero
for the type H individual. This is the usual no distortion at the top result which arises
because no incentive constraint towards these individuals is binding.
Type L We obtain from (14) that this individual is subject to a downward distortion
on their choice of retirement if (and only if) λHL > 0 that is in Regimes 1 and 2.
Type D Using (15) we see that there may or may not be a distortion in the choice
of z for this type, depending on λHD. When λHD > 0, zD is subject to a downward
distortion which does not come as a surprise. This occurs in Regime 1 only. In the
two other regimes where λHD = 0 individuals of type D are subject to no distortion.
This may appear surprising at first because an incentive constraint towards D, namely
(LD) is binding. However, since D and L have the same indifference curves, a distortion
would not be an effective way to relax this incentive constraint.7
An interesting question which arises is whether the introduction of audit makes the
lazy retire later than the disabled? The answer depends on the regime. In Regime 3,
neither type D or L are subject to distortions. Since type D workers are on a higher
indifference curve, we unambiguously have zL > zD. In Regime 2, there in an implicit
tax on zL but the disabled receive a higher transfer than the lazy. These transfers have
an effect that fosters early retirement so that the comparison between zL and zD is
ambiguous. In Regime 1 where the comparison between zD and zL seems ambiguous
(both being distorted downwards), we can rank them unambiguously. To see this, we
write (HL) , (LD) and (HD) as equalities and combine them, yielding:
RL (zL)−RH (zL) = (1− π) [RL (zD)−RH (zD)] . (16)
7To be more precise, the mimicked individual would be hurt as much as the mimicker. Consequently,
a distortion cannot be welfare-improving.
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The LHS of this expression is the utility differential between H and L at L ’s consump-
tion bundle. It gives the rent which must be conceded to H to prevent mimicking of L.
The RHS is also a utility differential between H and L but at D’s consumption bundle.
This shows the extra rent H must be granted compared to L at a solution where both
types are prevented from mimicking D. This second rent is weighted by the probability
of not being detected by the audit since types H and L are subject to audit when mim-
icking type D. Not surprisingly, when (HL) , (LD) and (HD) are binding the two rents
in (16) are equalized. These two rents being increasing in z by convexity of R (.), one
has zD > zL. Consequently, in Regime 1 we do have the result that disabled individuals
retire later than the lazy ones.
All these results are valid for any arbitrary level of the audit probability (0 < π < 1).8
To determine the optimal level of π, we have to use the first-order condition (A7). It
shows that the determination of π involves a tradeoff between costs (µpDk0) and benefits
that depend on the utility gap between truthtelling and being caught. Quite evidently
the larger the audit costs, and the larger u
¯
the lower will be π. Conversely, the lower
the audit costs, the higher will be π. Note, however, that auditing with probability
one (π = 1) is never optimal. This is a standard result in auditing models. It directly
follows from (A7) by observing that when π = 1, (LD) and (HD) are satisfied with
strict inequality consequently we would have λLD = λHD = 0 which implies that the
derivative is negative. This makes sense, when incentive constraints are satisfied with
strict inequality, they continue to be satisfied when audit probability (and hence audit
cost) is slightly reduced.
Not much can be said analytically about the factors explaining the occurrence of
one regime rather than another. However, it is clear that π, which in turn is determined
by audit costs will play a crucial role. In particular, when π is high enough, Regime 1
cannot occur. To see this suppose that (LD) and (HL) bind. Using the expressions for
the incentive constraints it follows that (HD) is not binding when
RL (zL)−RH (zL)− (1− π) [RL (zD)−RH (zD)] > 0. (17)
8Consequently, they also apply when the audit probability is exogenously given (rather then set at
its optimal level).
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Figure 1: Solution without and with auditing.
which necessarily holds when π is close to one.
Figure 1 illustrates the above solution for Regime 2 as well as the solution without
audit studied in Subsection 3.2. Without audit, individuals of type H consume the
bundle h and the individuals D and L who cannot be distinguished consume c = d.
With audit, we have c and d for the lazy and the disabled respectively. Now the disabled
could get a consumption level as high as that of the individuals h. However, while this
would be true at the first-best, it is of course not desirable in a second-best setting.9
With λHD = 0 (Regime 2), individuals D do not face any distortion.10 The comparison
between zD and zL is ambiguous. Type D individuals are on a higher indifference
curve; this income effect decreases labor supply. Type L individuals are subject to
a positive marginal tax which tends to decrease labor supply. Summing up, one can
expect individuals of type D to work less (retire earlier) then individuals of type L if the
income effect is sufficiently important (or if audit probability is large). The individuals
L work more and consume also more than in the pooling equilibrium. We now turn to
a numerical illustration.
9This follows directly from (A1) and (A3).
10Regime 1 yields a similar representation, except that D now faces a distortion.
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3.4 Illustration
The functional form we use is given by:
u (ci, zi) = ln ci − αi
z2i
2
,
with the following parameter values
H L D
αi 1 5 5
pi 0.6 0.1 0.3
ϕi 1 0.3 1
wi 100 100 100
We consider three audit technologies depending on their cost: audit 1 is relatively
expensive
¡
k (π) = 2000π2
¢
and implies π = 0.06, λHL > 0 and λLD > 0 and λHD > 0
(Regime 1); audit 2 is cheaper
¡
k (π) = 1000π2
¢
and implies π = 0.10 with λHL > 0
and λLD > 0 (Regime 2). Finally audit 3 is the cheapest
¡
k (π) = 100π2
¢
and implies
π = 0.49 (and Regime 3). In all cases, u = 0. The results are given in Table 1.
First-best Pooling
Types D L H D L H
c 88.39 26.51 88.39 54 54 92.48
z 0.22 0.75 1.13 0.30 0.30 1.08
u 4.35 1.85 3.84 3.75 3.75 3.94
T 0 (z) 0 0 0 0.17 0.17 0
Audit 1 Audit 2 Audit 3
Types D L H D L H D L H
c 65.29 49.72 89.32 70.74 48.23 87.94 81.42 46.59 84.95
z 0.29 0.28 1.11 0.28 0.30 1.13 0.24 0.43 1.17
u 3.95 3.70 3.86 4.05 3.64 3.83 4.24 3.38 3.74
T 0 (z) 0.03 0.28 0 0 0.26 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Numerical example, Paretian objective
First, observe that starting from the no auditing pooling solution, introducing audit
1 leads to Regime 1 where all three incentive compatibility constraints are binding.
Turning to a less expensive technology (and thus to a higher level of audit) implies a
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regime where (HD) no longer binds. This illustrates the argument we made on the basis
of (17). For even smaller audit costs we obtain Regime 3. Observe, however, that if the
audit technology would be completely costless, we would have either only (HL) binding
if ϕL is relatively high or the first best if ϕL is relatively low11.
Second, we observe that in all the second-best solutions the consumption of D is
kept below that of H whereas in the first-best the two types have the same consumption.
Not surprisingly, the difference between cH and cD decreases as the audit probability
increases. Furthermore, in the pooling solution we have cD = cL while with auditing
cD > cL holds; as expected the difference between cD and cL increases as audit become
cheaper and more intense and thus allows for a better screening. Finally, in Regime 1
D retires later than L which is in line with the analytical result obtained above. In the
other two regimes, however, we have zD < zL, even though L faces a positive marginal
tax in Regime 2 while D’s marginal tax is zero. This illustrates the idea that the income
effects (transfer to D) can dominate the substitution effects (marginal distortions).
4 Alternative specification
We now consider an alternative specification wherein the social planner paternalistically
attributes to the lazy workers a disutility RL rather than RH . In other words, he wants
them to work more and not to consume less. Once again, we start by considering the
full information solution.
4.1 Full information solution and decentralization
With the paternalistic approach the full information problem is given by:
max
X
i
piu (ci)− pHRH (zH)− pLRH (zL)− pDRL (zD) + µ
X
i
pi (ci −wzi) .
The solution is easily obtained. Both healthy types (namely H and L) are assigned the
same retirement age, the disabled individuals retire earlier and all individuals have the
11 If the first best allocation described in section 3.1 respects (HL) then the first best allocation is
implementable with audits. If it is not (which is the case if ϕL is high enough) then (HL) would bind
with free audit.
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same consumption level:
zD < zL = zH and cD = cL = cD.
The laissez-faire solution does not depend on the social objective and is thus the
same as in Subsection 3.1. Consequently it is given by equations (7) with the implication
that cD = cL < cH and zD = zL < zH . Decentralizing the first-best, however, is now
not as simple as in the non-paternalistic specification. Lump sum transfers are not
sufficient; one also needs a subsidy (negative marginal tax), on the labor supply of type
L individuals. To see this, note that the decentralized choice of zL is determined by:
(w − T 0 (zL))u0 (cL)−R0L (zL) = 0 (18)
which coincides with the socially optimal one
w u0 (cL)−R0H (zL) = 0. (19)
when the marginal tax rate is given by
T 0 (zL) = −
[R0L (zL)−R0H (zL)]
u0(cL)
< 0, (20)
so that we effectively have a subsidy. In words, the rate of subsidy is equal to the
difference between “private” and the “social” marginal valuation for zL (evaluated at
the optimal allocation). Paternalism introduces a wedge between private and social
valuation of type L’s labor supply and the decentralization of the optimum requires a
“Pigouvian” subsidy.
4.2 Unobservable types: second-best solution
Let us now turn to the second-best problem, where types are not observable. With
three types, we then have to consider six incentive constraints. As in Section 3, we start
with the no-audit case, for which one can show that only (HL) , (HD) and (LD) can
possibly be binding.12 Clearly, when (HD) is binding together with (HL) and (LD) ,
12 In other words the upwards constraint (LH) and (DH) cannot be binding. While this property is
not surprising, its proof is somewhat tedious. It is omitted here but is available from the authors upon
request.
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one has a pooling optimum. The program is now:
max
X
pi u (ci)− pH RH (zH)− pL RH (zL)− pD RL (zL)
+ µ
X
pi (wzi − ci) + λHL [u (cH)−RH (zH)− u (cL) +RH (zL)]
+ λHD [u (cH)−RH (zH)− u (cD) +RH (zD)]
+ λLD [u (cL)−RL (zL)− u (cD) +RL (zD)]
The first-order conditions with respect to zH and cH yield the traditional no distortion
at the top result: the marginal rate of substitution of type H continues to be given by
(7). The FOC with respect to zL, zD, cL and cD are:
(pL − λHL + λLD)u0 (cL) + µpL = 0 (21)
(pD − λHD − λLD)u0 (cD) + µpD = 0 (22)
− pLR0H (zL)− µpLw + λHLR0H (zL)− λLDR0L (zL) = 0 (23)
− pDR0L (zD)− µpDw + λHDR0H (zD) + λLDR0L (zD) = 0 (24)
This yields:
MRSL =
R0L (zL)
u0 (cL)
= w +
·
pL − λHL
pL − λHL + λLD
¸ ·
R0L (zL)−R0H (zL)
u0 (cL)
¸
, (25)
where pL−λHL+λLD > 0 from (21) while the sign of (pL−λ) appears to be ambiguous.
Furthermore we have
MRSD =
R0D (zD)
u0 (cD)
= w − λHD
(pD − λLD − λHD)
·
R0L (zD)−R0H (zD)
u0 (cD)
¸
(26)
where (pD−λLD−λHD) > 0 from (22) so that we necessarily have a downward distortion
for type D’s choice of z. The new feature which arises here is that D and L are no longer
necessarily pooled even when there is no audit. More precisely, we have
Lemma 2 The optimum pools D and L if and only if R0L (zL) /u0 (cL) < w that is iff
pL < λHL.
To interpret this result, consider equation (25). The distortion on zL is of ambiguous
sign. When pL > λHL, the RHS of (25) is larger than w so that we have an upward
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distortion on labor supply (a negative marginal tax rate). Conversely, pL < λHL yields a
downward distortion and thus a positive marginal tax. To understand the role played by
this term, note that the distortion in type L’s labor supply is determined by balancing
two conflicting objectives. First, there is the standard (Mirrlees-type) incentive effect
which calls for a downward distortion (positive marginal tax) on L’s labor supply in
order to relax the incentive constraint from type H to type L. The significance of this
effect depends on λHL, the Lagrange multiplier of this incentive constraint. Second,
there is a “paternalistic” effect, which calls for an increase in type L’s labor supply
compared to the laissez-faire level. Recall, that social disutility of their labor is smaller
than their private disutility. This pleads in favor of an upward distortion (a negative
marginal tax). This effect is the more significant, the larger the proportion of group L
in the economy. When pL is large enough, the paternalistic consideration is dominant
so that there is a marginal subsidy on zL. In this case, there is no reason to pool
individuals L and D because there is no need of distortion on zD. However, when pL is
small, incentive considerations dominate and a marginal tax is called for on zL. In this
case, one necessarily pools individuals L and D in order to prevent individuals H from
mimicking individuals D.
To sum up, when pL is large enough, the optimum entails separation between type
D and L individuals. In this case, there is no distortion on zD and a marginal subsidy
on zL. When pL is small, one has a pooling optimum with a marginal tax on zL and
zD. Note finally, that in the separating optimum, one necessarily always has zL > zD.
4.3 Second-best with audit in the paternalistic case
Introducing audit as in Section 3, while continuing to assume that the upwards con-
straints (LH) and (DH) are not binding, the social planner problem can now be written
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as the maximization of:
L2 =
3X
i=1
piu (ci)− pHRH (zH)− pLRH(zL)− pDRL(zD)
+µ
"
3X
i=1
pi(wzi − ci)− pDkπ
#
+λLD[u (cL)−RL (zL)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RL (zD))− πu]
+λHL [u (cH)−RH (zH)− u (cL) +RH (zL)]
+λHD [u (cH)−RH (zH)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RH (zD))− πu]
+λDL [u (cD)−RD (zD)− u (cL) +RD (zL)]
The FOC are stated Appendix A3. Combining and rearranging these conditions yield
the following expressions for the marginal rates of substitution of the different types:
R0H (zH)
u0 (cH)
= w. (27)
R0L (zL)
u0 (cL)
= w +
(pL − λHL) [R0L (zL)−R0H (zL)]
(pL + λLD − λDL − λHL)u0(cL)
S w (28)
R0L (zD)
u0 (cD)
= w − λHD (1− π) [R
0
L (zD)−R0H (zD)]
(pD − (λLD + λHD) (1− π) + λDL)u0 (cD)
≤ w. (29)
Before commenting on these expressions, it is necessary to determine the possible
regimes. To reduce the number of cases, we can first note that Lemma 1 continues
to hold in the alternative specification.13 Next, Appendix A5 provides a sequence of ad-
ditional Lemmas which show that in the paternalistic case, only two regimes are possible
which are given by:
Regime Binding incentive constraints
1 (HL), (HD), (LD)
2 (HL), (LD)
Consequently, it turns out that Regime 3, where only (LD) was binding cannot arise
here.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of conditions (27)—(29) while taking into ac-
count that in both possible regimes (DL) is not binding so that we have λDL = 0.
13The proof in Appendix A2 does not rely on the objective function of the government.
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Equation (27) is the usual no distortion at the top property. Turning to (28) observe
that (pL + λLD − λHL) > 0 from (A12), while (pL − λHL) is ambiguous. As in the
preceding section, when pL > λHL, paternalistic considerations are dominant and call
for a marginal subsidy on zL. When pL < λHL, incentive considerations dominate and
a positive marginal tax on zL is optimal.
For the interpretation of (29), on the other hand, we have to distinguish Regime 2
with λHD = 0 from Regime 1 with λHD > 0. The results are exactly like in Section 3.
In Regime 2, λHD = 0, there is no distortion in the choice of retirement for the truly
disabled. The mimicking individual L has the same indifference curves as individual
D. Consequently, there is no way to create a distortion which hurts the mimicker more
than the mimicked. Put differently a distortion is not an effective way to relax the
incentive constraint. Consequently, the retirement choice of type D is treated at the
margin exactly like that of the type H individual (zero marginal tax). In Regime 1, on
the other hand, we have λHD > 0, and there is a distortion towards earlier retirement.
This distortion relaxes the incentive constraint (HD). As in Section 3, this distortion
is likely to be effective for a relatively low probability of auditing.
The comparison between zL and zD is the same as in Section 3. Note however that
Regime 1 cannot occur when there is a marginal subsidy on zL. To see this, recall that
Regime 1 implies a distortion on zD and zL < zD. Since D is on a higher indifference
curve, this is incompatible with a marginal subsidy on zL. We summarize this in the
following lemma:
Lemma 3 When pL > λHL, Regime 1 cannot occur.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the problem with auditing. On the
figure we have three points in the (y, c) space. The consumption bundle for individuals
of typeH is represented by h, where the slope of the indifference curve is 1. The distance
between h and the (no tax) budget line c = wz is the transfer individuals of type H
have to pay. Point c is the solution for individuals of type L with slope different from 1.
We have represented the case where the slope is higher than 1, but it could have been
less. Here individuals L are subject to a marginal subsidy and receive a transfer. Note
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Figure 2: Paternalistic objective: solution with auditing
the binding incentive constraint form H to L and the relative slope at c of these two
types indifference curves. Finally, d is the solution for individuals of type D. The slope
is 1 (no distortion as for individuals H); they receive a larger transfer than individuals
L. They also work less (d is to the left of c). Note however that with a positive marginal
tax on L and a weak income effect, it is not impossible to have zD > zL in the second
best (recall that it is always the case in Regime 1). Finally, the indifference curve going
through c is a linear combination of that going through d and one yielding a level of
utility u.
Equation (A16) determines the optimal value of π which depends on both k, the
cost of auditing, and u
¯
, the penalty. Not surprisingly, the optimal audit probability
(for type D reports) is determined by the tradeoff between its negative effect on public
expenditures (−µpDk) and its positive effect via the welfare gain stemming from less
stringent IC constraints.
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First best No audit
Types D L H D L H
c 86.74 86.74 86.74 57.72 57.72 94.04
z 0.28 1.15 1.15 0.39 0.39 1.06
u 4.29 1.80 3.79 3.74 3.74 3.97
T 0 (z) 0 −3 0 0.09 0.09 0
Audit 1 Audit 2
π = 0.04, Regime 1 π = 0.08, Regime 2
Types D L H D L H
c 65.35 54.05 91.55 68.06 53.70 90.59
z 0.38 0.37 1.09 0.36 0.41 1.10
u 3.88 3.71 3.92 3.95 3.63 3.89
T 0 (z) 0.003 0.19 0 0 0.11 0
Table 3: Numerical example: Paternalistic objective, Scenario 1.
4.4 Illustration: paternalistic objective
We use the same utility function as in Section 3 and continue to assume u = 0. However
in order to illustrate the pooling and the separating optima, we will consider the two
following scenarios for the parameter values:
Scenario1 Scenario2
H L D H L D
αi 1 4 4 1 4 4
pi 0.6 0.07 0.33 0.6 0.2 0.2
wi 100 100 100 100 100 100
These two scenarios differ in the proportion of type L and D in the economy. In
Scenario 1, there is a small proportion of type L individuals while this proportion is
larger in Scenario 2. In addition, we consider two audit technologies depending on
their cost: Audit 1 is relatively expensive
¡
k (π) = 2000π2
¢
while Audit 2 is cheaper¡
k (π) = 1000π2
¢
. The results are given in Table 3 (Scenario 1) and Table 4 (Scenario
2).
Not surprisingly, Audit 1 implies lower audit probabilities than Audit 2. In scenario
1, pL is relatively low so that without audit, a pooling optimum will occur with a positive
marginal tax on zL and zD. As in the case of the Paretian objective, as audits increase,
one goes from Regime 1 to 2. In Regime 1, lazy individuals will work less than the
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FirstBest No audit
Types D L H D L H
c 92.19 92.19 92.19 52.20 70.07 97.8
z 0.27 1.08 1.08 0.47 0.61 1.02
u 4.37 2.17 3.93 3.49 3.49 4.06
T 0 (z) 0 −3 0 0 −0.71 0
Audit 1 Audit 2
π = 0.12, Regime 2 π = 0.20, Regime 2
Types D L H D L H
c 60.54 70 95.67 67.20 71.50 94.42
z 0.41 0.68 1.04 0.37 0.75 1.05
u 3.76 3.31 4.01 3.93 3.13 3.98
T 0 (z) 0 −0.91 0 0 −1.15 0
Table 4: Numerical example: Paternalistic objective, Scenario 2.
disabled while in Regime 2 they turn to work more.
In scenario 2, the optimum without audit involves separation between individuals
D and L. This is because pL is now relatively high so that paternalistic considerations
dominate. In this case, the second best without and with audit involves no distortion
on zD while a marginal subsidy is called for on zL.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the design of retirement cum disability benefits in a three type setting.
Healthy individuals have a low disutility of labor (continued activity). The two other
types have identical preferences with a high disutility of labor. However, they differ in
their (unobservable) health status. Type L individuals have a high disutility for labor
because they are leisure prone. Type D individuals, on the other hand, have a high
disutility because they are disabled. We start from the premise that policy makers are
not prepared to treat types D and L alike. Helping type D individuals and allowing
them to retire early with “generous” benefits is considered as legitimate. However,
society does not want to extend such a generous treatment to the L type individuals.
Formally, this is introduced by considering either a (Paretian) social welfare function
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which puts less weight on the type L individuals, or by using a paternalistic social
welfare function which does not fully account for the type L individual’s disutility of
labor.
In either setting, a first-best solution would imply earlier retirement for D than for
L (zD < zL). However, when the health status is not observable, it may or may not be
possible to separate the two types out, so that the second-best may imply zD = zL. In
that case, the effectiveness of disability benefits is severely undermined by the presence
of the L type and the possibilities to help the disabled are limited. The situation can
be improved if costly audits (test for disability) become available. However, the second-
best with audit does not necessarily imply zD < zL; quite surprisingly, we may even
end up with a situation where the disabled retire later than the lazy (zD > zL). But
their consumption or rather their disability benefits are higher than those of workers of
type L. Another interesting finding of our analysis is that the optimum often implies
distorted retirement decision at least for types L and D. However, there are situation
in which there are no distortion, even in the second best, or where the distortions affect
only one of the types. We show that this depends on the pattern of binding incentive
constraints which in turns depends on how costly the audit is.
To put these results in perspective, it is interesting to consider the policy implica-
tions of the NBER and OECD studies explaining early retirement by a too extensive use
of social insurance programs is that one should make the overall system more neutral
towards retirement decisions. Demographic aging makes such a reform extremely press-
ing. The problem with such a linear reform is that it is clearly legitimate as it regards
workers who are not disabled nor involuntarily unemployed. It makes economic sense to
decrease the generosity of social insurance programs for those who “abuse” the system.
However, for those who are truly disabled or unemployed, such a reform necessarily
implies lower benefits and this is questionable. From a public finance viewpoint, the
reform works; from a social welfare viewpoint, it is likely to be catastrophic.
What we show in this paper is that to avoid such an outcome one should introduce
or strengthen the audit and control techniques allowing to sort out leisure-prone workers
and true disabled individuals. So doing one can at the same time keep the disability
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benefits at a sufficient high level while inducing the non-disabled to work longer. We
have focused on the disability insurance. The same approach should be used to deal
with unemployment insurance.
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Appendix
A1 First-order conditions for L1
Differentiating L1 yields the following FOC:
∂L1
∂cH
= ϕH pH u0 (cH)− pH µ+ (λHL + λHD)u0 (cH) = 0 (A1)
∂L1
∂zH
= −ϕH pH R0H (zH) + pH µ w − (λHL + λHD)R0H (zH) = 0 (A2)
∂L1
∂cL
= ϕL pL u0 (cL)− pL µ+ (λLD − λHL )u0 (cL) = 0 (A3)
∂L1
∂zL
= −ϕL pL R0L (zL) + pL µ w − λLD R0L (zL) + λHL R0H (zL) = 0 (A4)
∂L1
∂cD
= ϕD pD u0 (cD)− pD µ− (λLD + λHD) (1− π) u0 (cD) = 0 (A5)
∂L1
∂zD
= −ϕD pD R0L (zD) + pD µ w + λLD (1− π) R0L (zD)
+ λHD (1− π)R0H (zD) = 0 (A6)
∂L1
∂π
= −µ pD k0 + λLD [u (cD)−RL (zD)− u¯] + λHD [u (cD)−RH (zD)− u¯] ≤ 0.
(A7)
Remark 1 These first-order condition also apply to the case where π = 0, that is if the
is no audit, but if we do not a priori impose pooling between L and D. They can be used
to show that with π = 0, pooling is unavoidable. To see this recall that without audit,
L and D are on the same indifference curve. A simple graphical argument shows that
we have λHL > 0 and λHD = 0 when zL > zD while we have λHD > 0 and λHL = 0
when zD > zL. However, when λHL > 0 and λHD = 0 we have from (14)—(15) that
zL is distorted downwards, while zD is not distorted. But with both types on the same
indifference curve, this implies zD > zL and we have a contradiction. The case where
λHD > 0 and λHL = 0 can be dealt with along the same lines.
A2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume
λHD > 0 and λHL = 0. (A8)
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We then have
(LD) : u (cL)−RL (zL)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RL (zD))− πu¯ ≥ 0
(HD) : u (cH)−RH (zH)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RH (zD))− πu¯ = 0.
Using (HD) , (HL) holds with strict inequality if:
(1− π) (u (cD)−RH (zD)) + πu¯ > u (cL)−RH (zL) (A9)
Using (LD), a necessary condition for (A9) to hold is:
RL (zL)−RH (zL) < (1− π) [RL (zD)−RH (zD)]
Because R0L(z) > R0H(z), this requires zD > zL.
However, under conditions (A8), equations (28) and (29) imply zD < zL; this is
because there is a marginal subsidy on zL while there is a downward distortion for D
and because u(cD)−RL(cD) ≥ u(cL)−RL(cL) (from incentive constraint (DL)) so that
D is on a higher (or the same) indifference curve than L which implies that the income
effect reinforces the substitution effect (assuming that leisure is normal). To sum up,
we obtain a contradiction.
A3 First-order conditions for L2
Differentiating L2 yields the following FOC:
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∂L2
∂cH
= pH u0 (cH)− pH µ+ (λHL + λHD) u0 (cH) = 0, (A10)
∂L2
∂zH
= −pH R0H (zH) + pH µw − (λHL + λHD) R0H (zH) = 0, (A11)
∂L2
∂cL
= pL u0 (cL)− pL µ+ (λLD − λHL − λDL) u0 (cL) = 0, (A12)
∂L2
∂zL
= −pL R0H (zL) + pL µw − (λLD − λDL) R0L (zL) + λHL R0H (zL) = 0,(A13)
∂L2
∂cD
= pD u0 (cD)− pD µ+ λDLu0 (cD)− (λLD + λHD) (1− π)u0 (cD) = 0,(A14)
∂L2
∂zD
= −pD R0L (zD) + pD µw − λDLR0L (zD)
+
¡
λLD R0L (zD) + λHDR0H (zD)
¢
(1− π) = 0, (A15)
∂L2
∂π
= −µpD k + λLD (u (cD)−RL (zD)− u¯)
+λHD (u (cD)−RH (zD)− u¯) ≤ 0. (A16)
A4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We proof this by contradiction. Point (i) contradicts R
0
L(zL)
u0(cL) < w with L and
D0s separation. Point (ii) contradicts pooling D and L with R
0
L(zL)
u0(cL) > w.
(i) Suppose R
0
L(zL)
u0(cL) < w and that we separate individuals L and D. It necessarily
implies λHD = 0 otherwise the use of (HL) ,.(LD) and (HD) implies pooling. In
this case, one has R
0
L(zD)
u0(cD) = w by (26). Thus, since (HL) and (LD) are binding, one
necessarily has u (cH)−RH (zH) < u (cD)−RH (zD) which contradicts (HD).
(ii) Suppose we pool D and L with R
0
L(zL)
u0(cL) > w. Then making a change dcD =
R0L(zD)
u0(cD) dzD has no (first order) effect on individual D’s utility, (LD) and (HL), and
relaxes (HD) and the budget constraint. This contradicts the fact that we have an
optimum.
A5 Regimes in the paternalistic case
Lemma 4 If λDL > 0, then λHD > 0, λHL > 0 and λLD = 0.
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Proof. Suppose λDL > 0. By construction (LD) does not bind so that λLD = 0.
Further, one necessarily needs λHD > 0 otherwise ∂L∂π < 0 which contradicts π > 0.
Because λHD > 0, one has λHL > 0 by Lemma 1.
Lemma 5 A solution with λHD > 0, λHL > 0 and λLD = 0 is not possible.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume
λHD > 0, λHL > 0 and λLD = 0. (A17)
We then have
(HL) : u (cH)−RH (zH)− u (cL) +RH (zL) = 0
(HD) : u (cH)−RH (zH)− (1− π) (u (cD)−RH (zD))− πu¯ = 0.
Using (HL) and (HD) , (LD) holds with strict inequality if
RL (zL)−RH (zL) < (1− π) [RL (zD)−RH (zD)]
Because R0L(z) > R0H(z), this requires zD > zL.Because u (cD) − RL (zD) ≥ u (cL) −
RL (zL), zD > zL implies
R0L(zD)
u0(cD) >
R0L(zL)
u0(cL) . Thus, since
R0L(zD)
u0(cD) < w by (29), one
necessarily has λHL > pL. It implies ∂L2∂cL < 0 since λLD = 0. This contradicts the fact
that we have an interior optimum.
Lemma 6 A solution with λDL > 0 is impossible.
Proof. The result follows directly from the combination of Lemma 4 and 3.
Lemma 7 A solution with λLD > 0 and λHD = λHL = 0 is not possible.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume
λHD = λHL = 0 and λLD > 0. (A18)
First note that because λLD > 0, one has λDL = 0. Using (A10) and (A12), we have
u0 (cH)
u0 (cL)
= 1 +
λLD
pL
(1− π)
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which implies cL > cH .
By the same way, combining (A11) and (A13), we obtain
R0H (zH)
R0H (zL)
=
µw
µw − λLDR0L (zL)
which implies zL < zH . This contradicts (HL).
Lemma 8 A solution with λHL > 0 and λHD = λLD = 0 is not possible.
Proof. If it were the case, we would have ∂L2∂π < 0 which would contradict π > 0.
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